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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of individual and spousal characteristics on the labour force participation 
of individuals living in elderly two-adult households. The comparative approach taken here studies 
men and women separately and uses the first eight waves (1994-2001) of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). We compare results of three countries: Finland (a country with a high 
degree of women’s labour force participation), Belgium and Germany (countries where women’s 
labour force participation is relatively low). Results of multinomial logit model estimations suggest 
that are substantive differences between countries as well as between the behaviour of men and 
women across the various channels out of employment. We find evidence that a wife exerts a stronger 
influence on a husband’s retirement decision. One explanation for this may be found in asymmetric 
complementarities of leisure – a husband’s enjoyment of non-employment may depend much more on 
his wife also being non-employed than vice versa. There is evidence that the complementarities of 
leisure hypothesis dominates the hypothesis concerning the added worker (where the labour supply of 
one spouse increases when the other spouse’s income is reduced or disappears). These results are in 
line with evidence from the US and have some important implications: simulations of the effect of 
changes in the pension system on men’s retirement may yield incorrect answers if spillover effects are 
ignored. 
JEL classification: J16, J26. 
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1. Introduction 
Current and future trends are putting all European pension systems under severe pressure. The 
pressure originates from two main causes. First, there are the facts of the population structure and the 
rising share of older persons. This structure is developing as a result of falling fertility rates and rising 
life expectancies. A second fact concerns the declining labour force participation rates of older 
Europeans. This second point magnifies the rising share of older inactive persons and consequently the 
problem of financing pension systems. Although EU pension systems vary across member states, the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system dominates most countries and thus has to be seen as most vulnerable. 
The analysis in this paper approaches the specific pension finance problem stemming from the 
inactivity of older persons, as we consider what leads them to leave employment. 
The paper focuses on the labour supply behaviour of men and women in elderly households in three 
EU countries: Finland, Belgium and Germany. A common characteristic of these countries is their 
poor ranking of labour market participation rates for men aged 50 to 64. Finnish men (women) rank 20 
(4) out of 30 OECD countries, Germans rank 21 (17) whereas Belgians take the second-to-last place of 
29 (27). Table 1 presents key data per country and gender to describe the magnitude of the problem. 
Table 1. Employment rates, unemployment rates and retirement age 
Belgium Finland Germany   
Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
Employment
a   46.9%  18.2%  50.8%  42.1%  59%  29% 
Unemployment
b 3.4%  1.9%  8%  7.5% – – 
Effective retirement 
age
c
 
58.8  57 60.1 59.9 60.8 60.5 
Official retirement 
age
d 
65 62
e 65 65 65 63 
a  Employment/population rate (in percentages) adjusted for weekly hours worked for the age group 50-64 in the year 2000.  
b  Unemployment rate (in percentages of total labour force) of the age group 50-64 in 2001.  
c  Effective retirement age: average age of withdrawal from the labour force for individuals older than 40 years in 1995-2000.  
d  Official retirement age. 
e  This age increases to 65 for women working in the public sector. 
Source: OECD (2003 and 2004). 
 
The data underline that the (adjusted) employment rates for the age group 50 to 64 are very low. 
Further, there stands the gap between the official and the effective retirement age. Variation in this gap 
has been created by institutional changes, enabling employees to retire through early retirement 
channels. The high unemployment rate in Finland may reveal one of the latter effects.  
Until recently, retirement research has concentrated on the labour supply behaviour of elderly men. As 
the labour force participation of women increased, attention has shifted towards the issue of the labour 2 | MATTHIAS DESCHRYVERE  
supply behaviour of both men and women, and particular attention has been paid to the behaviour of 
both spouses in elderly couples. Although labour market research has shown that there are gender 
differences in several important areas, most of the research on retirement has focussed on men’s 
behaviour. And while analyses of gender differences in retirement decisions are more limited, a small 
but emerging strain of retirement literature has diverted its focus from men to a broader couple 
approach, which takes into account the retirement decisions of women and the interrelation and 
differences between genders. Such studies document that husbands and wives coordinate work and 
retirement decisions. A second finding reports differences in the retirement behaviour between 
married and unmarried individuals. 
This paper studies the labour force transitions of employed men and women aged 50 to 69 and 
analyses the effect of different individual and spousal characteristics on the retirement decision. We 
use information on socio-demographic, health and financial characteristics. Our study is based on the 
first eight waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), as these data 
offer high comparability between countries. The particular contribution of this paper is the comparison 
of men’s and women’s retirement behaviour across Belgium, Finland and Germany. It is crucial to 
compare results across EU countries in order to see the aspects in which countries are similar or 
different and the implications for the varying pension systems. Each country’s institutional 
background is used to interpret results.  
Our couple approach – explaining labour force transitions both by individual and spousal 
characteristics – is useful because it enables us to trace the significance of different cross-spousal 
effects. In addition, we are able to detect the asymmetries of the spousal effects across genders. This 
analysis tests three different hypotheses. A first hypothesis concerns the complementarities of leisure, 
a second is the assortative mating hypothesis and a third is the added worker hypothesis. The 
complementarities of leisure effect describes behaviour where the spouses coordinate work and leisure 
activities to spend time together. The assortative mating effect describes the fact that individuals tend 
to live with those who share similar preferences about work and leisure. In the first two hypotheses, 
the labour supply of the two spouses is positively correlated. The added worker effect describes 
behaviour where the labour supply increases when the spouse’s income is reduced or disappears. If the 
latter income effect dominates, then the labour supply of both spouses should have a negative 
correlation. The justification for our approach is based on the fact that not taking into account these 
spousal effects may bias estimates and consequently the results of the simulation of policy changes. 
This analysis contributes to the existing literature in at least three ways: 1) it pays special attention to 
women’s retirement and gender differences; 2) it takes into account spillover effects between spouses, 
as neglecting these may lead to a bias in the simulation results of policy changes; and 3) it pays special 
attention to country differences. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises aspects of the literature. Section 3 
describes the model. Section 4 presents the data and section 5 summarises the estimation results. 
Section 6 concludes and lists some policy implications. 
2. Previous  literature 
There are several ways in which the link between spouses’ retirement is studied. A first group of 
studies assumes that preferences are given by a household utility function (family utility model) and 
estimates structural models of joint retirement (Hurd, 1990; Gustman & Steinmeier, 2000 and 2002) or 
studies joint retirement by explaining joint labour market states (Jiménez-Martín et al., 1999). A 
second group estimates reduced-form models exploring the cross-effects of one spouse’s 
characteristics on the other spouse’s retirement decision in order to learn whether men and women 
respond similarly to incentives for retirement and whether spillover effects are significant (Coile, 
2003; Dahl et al., 2002; Johnson & Favreault, 2001).  
 LABOUR FORCE BEHAVIOUR OF MEN AND WOMEN IN ELDERLY TWO-ADULT HOUSEHOLDS | 3 
This analysis uses a reduced-form model, as this method of analysing couples’ retirement behaviour is 
agnostic about household behaviour. The advantage is that it does not impose a reciprocal influence on 
the labour force status of both spouses, which is relevant if asymmetries exist across genders. 
A growing body of literature concludes that retirement decisions are made within the context of the 
family. It recognises that a significant share of husbands and wives coordinate their labour supply at 
older ages and retire at about the same time. Recent evidence shows that joint retirement is frequent 
among married couples. There are different explanations why an individual retirement decision may 
be influenced by the spillover effects of the spouse. If spillover effects are important, estimating 
individual retirement decisions may lead to significant errors in predicting the impact of a change in 
social security policy on retirement behaviour. This literature is mainly based on US data and has put 
forward various factors to explain joint retirement, as set out below. 
A first factor is the widespread preference of husbands and wives to spend leisure time together, i.e. 
the complementarities of leisure hypothesis. The fact that married individuals may place greater value 
on leisure time when they can spend it with their spouses can raise retirement rates when the spouse is 
not working. This adds an extra dimension to the traditional modelling of the labour supply decision 
based on the assumption that individuals choose an optimal combination between the costs of foregone 
leisure and the benefits of increased income associated with paid employment. Previous studies in the 
US found substantial support for the hypothesis that individuals see the own leisure time and that of 
their spouse as complementary (Gustman & Steinmeier, 2000; Hurd, 1998). Coile (2003a) found that 
financial incentives in retirement plans affect the worker’s retirement decision, which in turn affects 
the behaviour of the spouse. She explained the existence of spousal spillover effects through efforts by 
spouses to coordinate retirement decisions in a manner consistent with the above hypothesis. 
A second factor is the fact that individuals tend to marry those who share similar preferences about 
work and leisure and not because they carefully coordinate work and leisure. This explanation for the 
coinciding timing of retirement is the assortative mating hypothesis. 
A third factor is the similarity of financial incentives on the job encountered by husbands and wives. 
Yet neither spousal selection nor financial incentives are a central explanation for joint retirement 
outcomes in literature from the US. 
An important American study is that by Favreault & Johnson (2001), who apply a detailed approach in 
analysing the coordination of retirement. The authors analyse the effect of the circumstances of the 
withdrawal of a spouse on that coordination. Their analysis makes a distinction between retiring 
voluntarily and involuntarily. If a worker retires involuntarily – because of health problems or job 
displacement – financial considerations may prevent his/her spouse from retiring. It has been noted 
that married individuals are less likely to retire if their spouses report work limitations. Severe 
disability may, however, reduce working hours for reasons of providing personal care to the disabled 
spouse.  
Although economists generally believe that retirement decisions are made based on a cost-benefit 
analysis and are always voluntary, for at least some workers this may not be the case. The 
circumstances of an individual’s withdrawal may affect the labour supply decisions of his/her spouse. 
For example, the authors examined how the employment and health status of the spouse affect 
retirement decisions. Their study is based on the economic assumption that individuals make labour 
supply decisions so as to maximise utility subject to budget constraints, and also that they evaluate 
consumption and leisure. The predicted net effect of a spouse’s labour supply on retirement is 
ambiguous. The income effect or added worker effect may dominate when a spouse’s retirement is 
involuntary. This again suggests that individuals may delay retirement when their spouses stop 
working because of health problems. Their model accounted for the endogeneity of spousal work 
status by using full information maximum likelihood techniques to model joint retirement decisions 
and spousal work status. Treating spousal work status as an exogenous variable and ignoring the 
potential correlation of unobserved factors that affect work decisions could bias estimates. They 
estimated the models separately for women and for men. They conclude that a worker has a higher 4 | MATTHIAS DESCHRYVERE  
probability of staying employed if his/her spouse has health problems as a reaction to the decline of 
family income. Spousal caregiving demands do not appear to encourage retirement for many persons 
at midlife. These findings underline the importance of marriage in providing insurance for those who 
become disabled. The importance of marriage highlights the relative vulnerability of those who are 
widowed, divorced or never married. It was also found that family roles are more important for wives’ 
decisions than for husbands’. The latter react to more proximate factors, such as their wives’ current 
work status. Men appear more likely to withdraw from the labour force to spend time with their 
spouses (Coile, 2003a). This evidence supports the view that there are asymmetries in the spillover 
effects across spouses. 
The empirical analysis of European retirement decisions has relatively few contributions compared 
with the US. For Germany, Blau & Riphahn (1999) found a strong propensity among couples to spend 
leisure time together. Financial variables have asymmetric effects on spouses’ labour force responses. 
There are strong impacts of health and age on transition behaviour with systematic cross-spouse 
effects. For Finland, Lilja (1996) found that the propensity for early retirement does not differ 
significantly between men and women and that the presence of a retired spouse encourages the other 
spouse to retire. In Belgium, Desmet & Lozachneur (2002) also detected spillover effects but wives 
were found to be more responsive to their husbands’ financial incentives whereas the reverse did not 
hold. They used a dataset of male and female private-sector workers and explained the above result by 
asymmetries in the complementarities of leisure. For a sample of EU countries, Jiménez-Martín et al. 
(1999) found strong evidence of complementary (but asymmetric) effects between the labour supply 
decisions of both spouses. In contrast to our results, they find that a husband’s decision affects a wife’s 
decision more than vice versa. Their research does not find evidence supporting the added worker 
effect. 
3. Models 
3.1  The probit model 
Individuals (i=1,…,n) flow out of employment at a certain point in time (t=1,…,T) because their 
expected utility (
er
it U ) exceeds the expected utility of working (
ew
it U ). 
0
* > − =
ew
it
er
it it U U y           ( 1 )  
The (change in) utility is determined by a vector of observable variables Xit (where ￿ is a vector of 
coefficients) and a stochastic error term uit. We assume the error term to follow a standard normal 
distribution. 
    it it it u X y + = β
*             ( 2 )  
Unfortunately, the expected utility of an individual that either flows out of employment or keeps on 
working in period t is not observed. Whether an individual stops working is all that is observed. The 
observed counterpart to the latent metric variable 
*
it y  is  it y , which takes a value of either 0 (keeps on 
working in t+1) or 1 (retires in t+1) as follows: 
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
≤
>
=
0 0
0 1
*
*
i
i
it
y if
y if
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Based on previous assumptions on the distribution of uit, the binary choice model can be specified as a 
probit model and ￿(.,.) is the normal distribution function. 
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( β β it it it it X X F X y P Φ = = =            (4) 
This is a non-linear model that expresses the probability of choosing to stop working and a maximum 
likelihood estimator is used. 
We report the marginal effects found by differentiating equation (4). Thus, the marginal effects are to 
be interpreted as the change in the probability of flowing out of employment given a change in an 
explanatory variable Xit. We allow the covariates to have various impacts on the flow out of 
employment for the two genders by carrying out the analysis separately for men and women. 
The sample only considers individuals who have selected themselves into the sample – first into 
employment and thereafter into non-employment. There are certainly lots of unobservable phenomena 
involved in individual choices. Because of this self-selection problem, reservations should be made 
concerning the interpretation of our results. 
3.2  The multinomial logit model 
For each individual we define a latent variable, which denotes the change in utility from moving from 
the state of working in year t to unemployment or inactivity in year t. Individuals (i=1,…,n) flow out 
of employment at a certain point in time (t=1,…,T) because their expected utility (
en
it U ) exceeds the 
expected utility of working (
ew
it U ). 
0
* > − =
ew
it
en
ijt ijt U U y     with j = 0,1,2  and t = 1994..T     (5) 
The change in utility is determined by a vector of observable variables Xit (where ￿ is a vector of 
coefficients) and a stochastic error term uit. The underlying hypothesis is that the determinants of the 
transitions from work into the states of unemployment or inactivity are identical. We assume the error 
term to follow a type I extreme-value distribution that is independent and identical across alternatives j 
and individuals i. 
ijt j it ijt u X y + = β
*             ( 6 )  
Unfortunately, the expected utility of an individual who either flows out of employment to 
unemployment, inactivity or keeps on working in period t is not observed. Whether an individual 
becomes unemployed, inactive or continues working is all that is observed. The observed counterpart 
to the latent metric variable 
*
it y  is  it y , which takes a value of either 0 (keeps on working in t+1) or 1 
(retires in t+1) is as follows: 
         
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
≤
>
=
0 0
0 1
*
*
ijt
ijt
ijt
y if
y if
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Based on previous assumptions on the distribution of uijt, the choice model can be specified as a 
multinomial logit model and ￿(.,.) is the type I extreme-value distribution, identically distributed 
across alternatives and individuals. 
∑
=
= Φ = = =
2
0
) ( ) ( ) 1 (
j
x
x
j it j it it ijt
it j
it j
e
e
X X F X y P
β
β
β β          (8) 
This is a non-linear model that expresses the probability of choosing state j and a maximum likelihood 
estimator is used. 
4. Data  description 
4.1  The concept of retirement 
Retirement can be defined in many ways. Empirical research has measured retirement based on 
information about either labour-market participation or income. To avoid the problematic nature of 
retirement our study uses labour force status as the basis for definition and measurement. In this 
approach we categorise individuals by their labour force status – employed or non-employed. The 
objective of this paper is to explain the transitions of elderly individuals out of employment. The 
sample only includes individuals who report to be working in year t. The dependent transition dummy 
has the value 1 in year t if an individual reports to be non-employed in year t+1. The transition dummy 
has the value 0 in year t if an individual reports that he/she is still employed in t+1. As it is crucial to 
raise the labour force participation of the elderly, the focus on simple transitions out of employment is 
highly relevant. Individuals may, however, flow out of employment to other states such as 
unemployment or inactivity. It may therefore be useful to concentrate on each of these channels by 
explaining a discrete variable that changes its value with each end state (see also Figure A.1). As a 
share of older persons gradually reduce their working time as they age, a useful elaboration of the 
analysis may take into account both part-time and full-time employment. 
4.2  Couple’s labour supply 
In Table 2 we show the percentages of couples in all possible labour supply choices for our initial 
sample. It is clear that there are households with all possible combinations of men’s and women’s 
labour supply. The highest numbers of households are located in the cells representing the inactivity of 
both spouses (27% to 45%) and both spouses being employed (20 to 40%), which may point to 
complementarities in leisure. Nevertheless, there are many households where only one spouse is 
working while the other is inactive. In Belgium and Germany there is a higher share of employed 
husbands with inactive wives than the opposite. Remarkably, Finland shows a higher share of working 
wives with inactive husbands. In general, Finland has notably lower share of inactive wives (36%) 
compared with Belgium (69%) and Germany (55%). 
Further evidence of the labour force participation structure of the households is provided by Tables 3 
and 4. Most of the male and female transitions are out of the labour force. Flowing directly from 
employment to inactivity is most frequent for Belgian households. In all three countries the transition 
from unemployment to inactivity is frequently made. This shows that becoming inactive is reached 
through unemployment in a significant number of cases. This is especially true for German men and 
women where up to 30% of the unemployed flow into inactivity. This can partly be explained by the 
fact that in Germany employed elderly men and women have the highest probability of becoming 
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 Table 2. Couple’s labour supply choices (in percentages) 
employed unemployed inactive Total
employed 20 32 1 4 5
unemployed 1 0 (0.3) 34
inactive 4 2 45 51
Total 25 6 69 100
employed unemployed inactive Total
employed 40 48 5 2
unemployed 3 2 16
inactive 12 3 27 42
Total 56 8 36 100
employed unemployed inactive Total
employed 24 41 9 4 6
unemployed 3 1 48
inactive 9 3 33 46
Total 36 9 55 100
h
u
s
b
a
n
d
h
u
s
b
a
n
d
h
u
s
b
a
n
d
Belgium
Finland
Germany
wife
wife
wife
 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
Table 3. Transition rates of husbands (in percentages) 
employed unemployed inactive
employed 88,57 1,00 10,43 
unemployed 6,25 76,56 17,19
inactive 0,99 0,83 98,18
Total 44,31 4,32 51,37
employed unemployed inactive
employed 90,17 2,82 7,01
unemployed 13,07 60,30 26,63
inactive 2,97 0,61 96,42
Total 51,43 5,37 43,2
employed unemployed inactive
employed 86,40 5,16 8,44
unemployed 11,61 57,37 31,02
inactive 2,37 2,12 95,51
Total 46,06 8,61 45,33
Belgium
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
Finland
Final state
Final state
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
Germany
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
Final state
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
It is important to note that persons in Belgium have the lowest probabilities of changing labour force 
states. There is a strong trend towards becoming and staying inactive, which shows the inflexibility of 
the Belgian labour market. In Finland more women than men become unemployed. It is also clear 
from the tables that non-participation is not necessarily an absorbing state: there is a small probability 
of re-entering the labour market after an initial period of non-participation, which is especially true in 
Germany and Finland. 
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Table 4. Transition rates of wives (in percentages) 
employed unemployed inactive
employed 85,67 1,65 12,69 
unemployed 0,00 81,17 18,83
inactive 0,86 1,02 98,12
Total 20,45 5,88 73,67
employed unemployed inactive
employed 89,59 4,04 6,37
unemployed 11,19 64,93 23,88
inactive 2,78 1,02 96,20
Total 52,08 8,31 39,61
employed unemployed inactive
employed 84,49 6,28 9,23
unemployed 11,09 62,28 26,62
inactive 2,40 1,74 95,86
Total 31,40 8,91 59,69
Germany
Final state
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
Belgium
Final state
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
Finland
Final state
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
Our analysis only focuses on the transitions from employment to non-employment, as these have the 
biggest negative impact on a country’s production and budget. It is clear that a complementary 
approach could concentrate on transitions from unemployment to inactivity. 
4.3 Data 
The dataset used in this study is the ECHP. The ECHP encompasses a lot of socio-economic 
information such as the respondents’ economic background, employment status, job history, income 
sources, health status and wealth. This dataset contains eight waves that have been released from 1994 
to 2001 for up to 15 EU countries. The same questionnaire is adopted by the national data collection 
units in each participating country. The advantage of these country data is their high comparability 
level. The survey is composed of a household and a personal file, and the same individuals and 
families are interviewed over time. In the first wave (in 1994) a sample of some 60,500 nationally 
representative households – approximately 130,000 adults aged 16 years and older – were interviewed 
in the EU member states. Austria (1995) and Finland (1996) have joined the project since then. For the 
fourth wave of the ECHP, in 1997, the original ECHP surveys were stopped in three countries, namely 
Germany, Luxembourg and the UK. In these countries, existing national panels were used and 
comparable data were derived from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) – back from 1994 onwards. 
4.4  Sample formation and descriptive statistics 
This analysis focuses on members of two-adult households. Our sample of Belgian, Finnish and 
German households includes men and women aged 50 to 69 with a spouse aged 45 to 70. As described 
earlier, our sample consists only of employed individuals as our analysis studies the transitions from 
employment to non-employment. The sample selection is for employed individuals who belong to a 
two-adult household (with both members alive in each period). Table 5 presents the sample shares of 
two-adult households by seven economic types. The shares are fairly similar across countries although 
Finland has a higher share of households with one dependent child. After deleting observations that LABOUR FORCE BEHAVIOUR OF MEN AND WOMEN IN ELDERLY TWO-ADULT HOUSEHOLDS | 9 
are missing important information, we have a maximum sample of 2,544 households, which are 
observed in up to eight consecutive periods. Summary statistics of these observations with respect to 
socio-demographic and economic variables can be found in Appendix A. 
Table 5. Sample shares per economic household type (in percentages) 
Household type (economic typology)  Belgium  Finland  Germany 
Two adults without a dependent child, with at least one person aged 
65 or older 
4.94 6.66 7.04 
Two adults without a dependent child, with both under age 65  41.07  54.64  49.88 
Other household without dependent children  24.71  12.74  27.39 
Two adults with one dependent child  10.86  14.37  5.87 
Two adults with two dependent children  6.48  5.66  2.04 
Two adults with three or more dependent children  1.63  0.95  0.30 
Other household with dependent children  10.30  4.98  7.48 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
Of the final sample of the employed, between 15.5% (FI) and 35.6% (DE) of the individuals flow into 
non-employment (for BE the figure is 27.5%). We observe that 8.3% of individuals have a spouse who 
flows out of employment together with them within the sample timeframe. It is important to note that 
Finland has the highest percentage of couples flowing out of employment in the same year (14.23%), 
whereas Belgium (11.7%) and Germany (8.69%) are behind in that respect. This can partly be 
explained by the smaller mean of the age difference between spouses in Finland in our sample. About 
two-thirds of the synchronised outflows are towards inactivity. The synchronised outflow to 
unemployment is most profound in Germany and very limited in Belgium. Of the individuals’ spouses 
in the final sample, 61.9% are employed, 7.7% are unemployed and 30.4% are inactive. Individuals 
are about twice as likely to have an inactive spouse in Belgium and Germany as in Finland. 
A quick glance at the data reveals some interesting characteristics per country and gender. Table A.1 
depicts results for working men and women aged 50 to 69. The sample consists of 13,027 observations 
for three countries: Belgium (2,130), Finland (3,984) and Germany (6,913). Men comprise 60% of the 
sample and the average age is 54.5. More than 90% of the individuals are married. For obvious 
reasons the share of men with children is about three times higher for men than for women. The 
average net annual salary is about €25,000 for men and €15,000 for women. The average capital 
income is about €2,000 and a minimum of 58% of the individuals bought a house. Part-time work has 
a typically high share of employment for women (18%) compared with men (3%). Germany has a 
very small share of self-employed persons, which thus contributes to a lower labour supply. Self-
employed men have a larger share of the sample in Belgium (10%) and especially in Finland (15%). 
Public-sector workers contribute about 25% to the sample of men and nearly double that to the sample 
of women. 
If we turn to figures on transitions out of employment we note that numbers vary from 6.2% to 14.7%. 
Transitions are more frequent for women than for men, except in Belgium. Germany especially has 
high transition figures both for men (11.4%) and women (14.7%), whereas Finland has a more 
moderate frequency of transitions at about 6%. In the Belgian final sample transitions to inactivity are 
rather scarce (see Table A.1). In all cases transitions to unemployment are more often noted than 
transitions to inactivity. In Germany the unemployment channel seems to be most frequently used. 
As health is an important determinant of the labour supply behaviour of the elderly it is of interest to 
compare different health variables between our sub-samples at this stage. The sample share of persons 
with bad health varies between countries. Women report to be in bad health more often than men. An 
especially high share of German men and women are reported to be in bad health (about 17%). 
Belgium has a very small share of about 1% whereas Finland has about 4%. The share of persons 
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Germany but is remarkably lower in Belgium (about 10%). A lot of Finns (about 25%) and Germans 
(about 35%) are also hampered in their daily activities by health problems although these problems are 
clearly worse for Germans and again the least significant for Belgians (about 10%). The share of men 
and women who have been an inpatient at a hospital during the last 12 months is largest for Finland 
but generally varies around 10% in all the sub-samples. On average, Germans stay the longest in the 
hospital (more than one night) whereas Finns and Belgians only stay about half a night. It should be 
noted that all results have to be interpreted as conditional on each country’s age structure. The age 
means are nevertheless very similar and for Germany are only about one year higher. There is a 
concern, however, that the differences in health reports across countries may not only be the result of 
real health differences but also related to differences in reporting behaviour (Lindeboom & Van 
Doorslaer, 2003). 
4.5  The probabilities of ending in various end states 
In Table 6 we have calculated the probabilities of transition to different states for each gender, 
conditional on working. The probabilities of staying employed decrease over time. Simultaneously, 
the probabilities of ending in the states of being unemployed or inactive increase over time. This can 
be explained by the fact that the individuals in our sample are growing older. We found some striking 
differences across genders. Women are more likely to end up as unemployed whereas men tend to 
have a higher probability of continuing to work. Becoming inactive is more likely for men in Finland 
and Belgium than in Germany. 
Table 6. Exit probabilities (in percentages) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
Females
year UNEMP INACT EMP UNEMP INACT EMP UNEMP INACT EMP
1994 0,0 10,8 89,2 6,4 8,6 85,0
1995 2,5 9,9 87,7 6,5 10,4 83,1
1996 1,2 6,1 92,7 5,5 4,3 90,3 9,7 7,3 83,0
1997 2,5 8,8 88,8 3,5 6,7 89,8 5,4 10,2 84,4
1998 1,3 8,8 90,0 3,5 4,1 92,4 5,7 6,7 87,6
1999 1,3 9,0 87,7 2,9 2,9 94,1 5,2 6,8 88,0
2000 2,7 9,5 87,8 3,1 5,1 91,8 4,6 6,7 88,8
weighted probability 1,6 9,0 89,1 3,7 4,6 91,7 6,2 8,1 85,7
Males
year UNEMP INACT EMP UNEMP INACT EMP UNEMP INACT EMP
1994 1,0 10,5 88,5 3,9 7,9 88,2
1995 1,0 6,2 92,8 5,0 9,9 85,1
1996 0,5 11,7 87,8 4,1 4,7 91,3 5,9 8,5 85,7
1997 0,5 10,4 89,1 2,0 8,7 89,3 6,2 6,6 87,2
1998 1,6 7,3 91,2 1,9 4,4 93,8 6,3 9,1 84,6
1999 0,5 10,3 89,1 3,4 4,7 92,0 4,8 7,4 87,9
2000 1,2 7,1 91,8 2,0 3,7 94,2 5,0 6,0 89,0
weighted probability 0,9 9,1 90,0 2,7 5,2 92,1 5,3 7,9 86,8
Belgium Finland Germany
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5. Estimation  results 
We estimated reduced-form models of labour force participation. The estimation results of the 
multinomial logit model are summarised by country and gender in Table A.7. As the magnitudes for 
the coefficients are difficult to interpret we compute partial effects. The tables show these marginal 
effects and the z-values. For continuous variables the latter are evaluated at the mean. The three 
possible outcomes are unemployed, inactive and employed. The base category is employed. The 
explanatory variables are individual characteristics and spouse characteristics. 
We want to learn if men’s and women’s labour-force participation decision is similarly influenced by 
their individual characteristics. The goal is to estimate the impact of each individual’s characteristics 
and his/her spouse’s characteristics on an individual’s labour force decision. We also check for 
possible asymmetries in the spousal spillover effects. Results have to be interpreted carefully. 
Spurious effects may occur if we do not control for all the variables that are likely to have an 
independent influence on labour force participation. For example, such effects are likely if we fail to 
take into account pension incentives. 
Results of the Wald test and likelihood-ratio tests rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
equal zero across all equations. We also performed Wald and likelihood-ratio tests on whether any pair 
of outcome categories can be combined. In addition, we computed the Hausman test of the assumption 
of the independence of irrelevance alternatives (IIA) for each possible omitted category 
5.1 Individual  characteristics 
For Finland and Germany the results of the multinomial logit model are reported per gender as 
marginal effects with their corresponding z-values (see Tables A.3 to A.6). As the number of 
transitions to unemployment was too small for Belgium we estimated a probit model (see Table A.7). 
As expected, the older the individual the higher the likelihood s/he has of becoming inactive and the 
lower the likelihood s/he has of continuing to work. The linear age effect is positive and significant in 
all three countries for each gender. The effects are marginally stronger for men than for women and 
especially high in Belgium and Germany. In our sample age has no significant effect on becoming 
unemployed. 
It is expected that a higher investment in human capital should lower the propensity to retire as more 
highly educated persons start their working life later and perform on average less physically 
demanding jobs than those with less education (see also Figure A.2). The propensity to stay employed 
rises significantly for higher-educated Belgian and Finnish women. 
In Finland the number of children under the age of 14 has a negative effect on the propensity to 
become inactive for men whereas it has a positive effect for women (see Perrachi & Welch, 1994). 
The effect is significant for Finnish women becoming inactive. A negative effect for men suggests that 
this may have something to do with the obligations of being the principle earner whereas women could 
have a higher propensity to retire to take care of the household. In Germany having dependent children 
has an insignificant negative effect on becoming inactive for both men and women. The difference 
between women’s behaviour in Finland and Germany could be explained by the fact that the expected 
period of the dependency of children is higher in Germany and also by the fact that there are more 
housewives in Germany. 
The results show that in Finland both the married men and women in two-person households have a 
higher propensity to become inactive; Finnish men also have a higher propensity to become 
unemployed. Opposite results were found for married Belgian men. Results for Germany are 
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Health variables 
The effect of bad health on the labour force transitions of elderly couples has the expected positive 
sign except in Belgium, where there are very few observations of persons in bad health. A first dummy 
variable has the value 1 if individuals report to be in bad or very bad health. A second dummy variable 
refers to the stay in a hospital during the last 12 months. The decision to include both variables in the 
specification is based on the fact that both variables measure the relatively weak correlation between 
the two variables and the robustness of the results along alternative specifications. Under two 
definitions, gender and country (except Belgium), bad health has a significant positive effect on the 
propensity to retire (see also Figures A.3 and A.4). The opposite sign for Belgium does not have much 
credibility as the average Belgian reports to be in better health than Germans and Finns (so there are 
very few observations left in the bad health category). The effect is stronger for men than for women. 
The most significant effects are seen for Finland. The effect of being hospitalised recently is also 
positive but not always significant. Although there should be no doubt about the significance of these 
positive effects of bad health, the strength of the effect should be interpreted with care and may be too 
strong or too weak because of endogeneity problems (Bound, 1991). Concerning occupations, sectors 
in which health risks are greater may be more likely to have or develop institutions (such as pensions 
or disability insurance) that allow for early retirement.  
Relatively few studies examine both men and women in the same framework. Loprest et al. (1995) 
observe that the effects of disabilities on labour force participation are greater for men and single 
women than for married women. Kreider (1996) finds that non-working African Americans, high-
school dropouts and former blue-collar workers are more likely to over-report disabilities than white-
collar workers, and that men are more likely to over-report than women. These findings are consistent 
with the idea that workers in more physically demanding jobs may find disability a more compelling 
excuse for leaving the labour force than other workers or alternatively that white-collar workers are 
less likely to feel that a given condition limits their ability to work. Ettner (1997) finds that among 
women, self-reported measures of health are not affected by employment status (i.e. there is less 
reporting bias among women). The health measure was instrumented by the parents’ health. She points 
out that women may be under less pressure socially to attribute non-employment to ill health. 
Economic variables 
The effects of the net annual real wages are in the expected direction: higher wages are associated with 
a stronger attachment to employment. A higher net wage motivates men and women to keep on 
working longer and not to become inactive or unemployed. High wages naturally correlate with higher 
education, responsibilities and work satisfaction. The response to a given change in wages (and 
indirectly benefits) is generally between two (Finland and Belgium) to three (Germany) times larger 
for women than for men, consistent with the generally higher labour supply elasticities for women 
than men found in the literature. The elasticities are especially high for Belgium and Germany (Table 
7). It is important to note that in Finland wages are only significant in explaining the transition to 
employment and unemployment whereas in Germany it is also significant for the transition to 
inactivity. 
 Table 7. Inactivity elasticities of wages 
  Belgium Finland Germany 
Men -0.053  -0.003  -0.38 
Women -0.105  -0.005  -0.099 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
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Capital income is used as a proxy for wealth. A priori, the influence of own wealth on the retirement 
decision is not clear. On the one hand, increased wealth will improve the possibility of early retirement 
through the increased ability of self-support. Our results are in line with this view as the wealth proxy 
almost always has a positive impact on the probability of moving towards inactivity, which is 
especially true for men. On the other hand, wealth may be a proxy for both ability and social status. In 
that case we would expect a reduced probability of exiting to early retirement. Yet we do not find 
convincing evidence of the latter effect. Individuals with capital income may also be the ones that 
retire at the earliest years of the age range 50-69, as the wealth variable becomes more significant if 
persons aged 50 to 55 are added to the sample. 
Employment variables 
An interesting result concerns the significant negative impact of the part-time dummy on the 
probability of flowing into unemployment for both men and women. Women who work part-time have 
an especially smaller probability of using the unemployment channel. The effect is most significant for 
Germany and Finland and least for Belgium. The part-time dummy does not seem to play a significant 
role in the flow to inactivity.  
Satisfaction with work is expected to have a negative impact on the propensity to leave work while 
satisfaction with leisure should prompt individuals to have more of it by leaving work. The negative 
impact of work satisfaction and the positive impact of satisfaction with leisure are observed for both 
men and women. Effects seem to be especially significant for the flow into unemployment. In that 
sense satisfaction with work and leisure is a good predictor of becoming unemployed. These two 
important variables may, however, have a significant correlation with other variables such as bad 
health, income, education, working status and occupation. 
The self-employed form a special group of individuals as they generally have a particular pension 
system. Being self-employed has in most specifications a significant negative impact on the propensity 
to flow into unemployment and inactivity. The effect is more significant for men than for women. One 
explanation for this negative overall effect is certainly related to the pension schemes for the self-
employed. In Belgium, the self-employed have their own pension system, which is less generous than 
the ones of the public or private sector. Belgian self-employed persons do not have access to the 
unemployment insurance system and there is no other special regime they could use to retire early. 
Although there is a public disability system, the application of more stringent criteria than that which 
applies in the private sector prevent it from becoming a ‘well-loved’ early retirement channel. German 
self-employed persons are mainly self-insured, although some of them also participate in the public 
retirement insurance system. Finnish self-employed persons also have less generous pension rules. Yet 
a second explanation for the negative impact may be independent of the institutional background. Self-
employed persons may have common characteristics in that they are motivated, energetic individuals 
who like to work. Owing to the particular character of the pension system for self-employed persons 
and their individual characteristics, self-employed persons are sometimes excluded from the samples 
in retirement research although they certainly form an interesting category to focus on in future 
studies. 
Being a civil servant has a mostly positive effect on the probability of entering retirement in Finland 
and Germany. In the case of Finland this can be explained by the fact that the accrual rate used to be 
higher (see Appendix C). In the case of Germany this can be explained by the fact that civil servants 
have acquired pension claims that are very generous compared with workers in the private sector (see 
Appendix C). By contrast, for Belgian men and women, being employed in the public sector has a 
negative impact. In Belgium the public sector has its own pension system. It differs from the private 
sector system in that the official retirement age for women (65) is still higher and is equal to the one of 
men. The negative effect is especially significant for the broad retirement specification and signals that 
Belgian civil servants have more job security and do not (collectively or individually) use the 
unemployment channel as often as private-sector workers. 14 | MATTHIAS DESCHRYVERE  
We compared three occupational categories – managers and professionals, technicians, clerks and 
service workers – with blue-collar workers as a reference category and expected all three to have a 
more negative impact on the propensity to retire. Blue-collar workers have on average a more 
physically demanding job and start to work earlier in their life cycle. The negative impact for the three 
occupation dummies on the probability of moving out of employment is seen for Belgian men and 
women; in other countries the evidence is mixed. The negative impact is the strongest for clerks, 
service workers and technicians. For women the results are more dubious. In Finland, female 
technicians, clerks and service workers have a higher propensity to become unemployed. This shows 
that the Finnish unemployment channel may be used especially by women working in these 
occupations. There is similar but weaker evidence for German women, whereas German men working 
as clerks and service workers have a smaller probability of becoming unemployed. This can be 
explained by the fact that clerks and service workers enjoy more protected employment (for both 
women and men) but women use the unemployment channel more often to retire. 
The evidence of the impact of working in a small company is mixed. For men it has a negative impact 
on the transition to inactivity, which is significant for Germany and Belgium. The reason for this may 
be that in small companies the interpersonal connections are closer and the working atmosphere is 
better. As the social aspect is higher in smaller companies we may also assume that unsatisfied 
workers may leave smaller companies faster and as such those persons who are left are on average 
more satisfied. The effect on the probability of unemployment is positive for Finnish women and 
negative for German women.     
The year dummies (reference year 2000) are meant to take care of the timing and magnitude of the 
business cycles, as well as structural changes in the form of modifications and adjustments of the rules 
in force. The lack of gender coincidence could be explained by the fact that men and women work in 
different sectors. Institutional changes and business cycles influence the sectors differently. This 
influence was not picked up fully by the occupational dummies. 
5.2  Characteristics of couples 
For couples there are several sources of joint retirement behaviour, added worker versus assortative 
mating effects, and/or correlation in unobservables. As previously discussed, the added worker effect 
describes behaviour where the labour supply increases when the spouse’s income is reduced or 
disappears. The assortative mating effect describes behaviour where the partners have the same 
preferences, or in other words where the labour supplies of the two spouses are positively correlated. 
To analyse this potential impact, the list of explanatory variables is expanded with specific variables 
that refer to the characteristics of an individual’s spouse. For spouse variables we include: 
1)  the age difference between the individual and his/her spouse;  
2)  the capital income of the spouse;  
3)  the annual net wages of the spouse; 
4)  a sickness and invalidity benefit dummy; 
5)  a dummy for the spouse being an inpatient at a hospital during the last 12 months; 
6)  a dummy for the spouse being inactive; and finally, 
7)  a dummy for the spouse being unemployed.  
The estimation with gender-specific samples allows us to check whether the spousal effects are 
symmetrical or asymmetrical by gender. This analysis found mixed and scarce evidence of spousal 
spillover effects. Although there is evidence both for the added worker effect and the 
complementarities of leisure hypothesis, the latter effect dominates. Further, there is evidence of 
asymmetries in spousal effects, as husbands seemed to be more influenced by their wives than the 
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One would expect that individuals who are older (younger) than their spouse ceteris paribus have a 
higher (lower) propensity to retire. In our sample the difference in age between individuals and their 
spouses has no sizable effect on retirement behaviour. The insignificant impact is, however, mostly 
positive as expected: the higher the age difference with the spouse, the higher the propensity to retire. 
In order to capture the wealth effect of the spouse, a capital income variable was included. For Finland 
this differs across genders as it is positive for men and negative for women. In Germany it is positive 
for the unemployment channel of men, negative for the unemployment channel of women and positive 
for the women’s inactivity channel. For Belgium men and women it is not significant. For Finland the 
effect is larger for men and very small for women. The evidence suggests that Finnish women have a 
stronger influence on the retirement decisions of men. The wealth results for Finland bring some 
evidence of the added worker effect for the male specification.  
A variable that correlates with the spouse being employed is the annual net wage of the spouse. The 
direction of the impact of the income variable clearly differs across country and gender. It is 
significant for the unemployment channel of German men and has a negative impact, supporting the 
complementarities of leisure or assortative mating hypothesis. For Belgium the impact is not 
significant. For Germany, Blau & Riphahn (1999) found a number of sizeable cross-spouse effects of 
the wage income. Having a high-earning husband generally increases the labour force mobility of 
wives, making them more likely to leave the labour force. Husbands of high-earning wives have 
increased probabilities of exiting employment. Finally, along with Blau & Riphahn, we found some 
evidence of cross-spouse wage effects that are asymmetric between the German spouses.  
The health of an individual can influence his or her preferences and our results revealed that 
individuals with bad health have on average a higher propensity to retire. The health characteristics of 
a spouse may also influence an individual’s retirement decision. Two contrasting effects have to be 
listed: 1) health problems of the spouse can prevent him/her from earning money and thus may force 
the individual to stay employed longer to financially compensate the loss of income (i.e. the added 
worker effect); and 2) if the spouse with health problems receives sickness or disability benefits the 
individual may have an extra incentive to stay at home and take care of the spouse (i.e. the assortative 
mating effect). Certainly the type of health problem involved is important. To capture health problems 
that prevent a spouse from being able to work, the inpatient-at-a-hospital variable is used. As both 
effects work in opposite directions, the composed effect depends on the stronger of the two. 
Results were most convincing for Germany. Only for German men did we find evidence of spousal 
health effects. For German men in particular the probability of becoming inactive declines if their 
spouse is receiving sickness or disability benefits. This supports the idea that a reduction in the wife’s 
income has to be compensated by a prolongation of the working career of the husband, a result in 
favour of the added worker effect. Yet this seems to depend on the kind of health problem 
experienced. Health problems leading to a recent hospital visit raise the probability of men becoming 
inactive. The latter weaker effect supports the idea that men stop working to take care of a hospitalised 
wife, a result in favour of the assortative mating effect. In no other cases did we find spousal health 
effects. That these mixed results are only valid for Germany is most probably connected with the 
different health care institutions in the other countries.  
For Germany, Blau & Riphahn (1999) found that wives are less likely to exit the labour force if the 
husband has a chronic condition and is still working and more likely to exit if the husband has left the 
labour force. But they also found that the same pattern does not hold for men – husbands are less 
likely to stop employment if the wife has a health condition. The latter result is in line with our 
findings. For a sample of EU countries, Jiménez-Martín et al. (1999) found that the individual’s own 
poor health is important and forms a positive incentive to withdraw from the labour force. The 
magnitude of this health effect depends on the labour force status of the spouse, suggesting either 
complementarities in leisure or a correlation in the unobservables of both spouses. Additionally, they 
find important and asymmetric cross-effects. It is striking that their results are the opposite of ours, as 
their results show that the husband’s health status is crucial in explaining joint retirement. 16 | MATTHIAS DESCHRYVERE  
Two other variables refer to the spouse being unemployed or inactive. The labour market state of the 
spouse definitely matters for the transition probabilities of men. In Finland men are less likely to keep 
on working if their spouse is inactive, although for women the results are less strong. In Germany 
women are more likely to become unemployed if their spouse is inactive. In Belgium the probability 
of men staying employed falls if the spouse is inactive, and for women the same effect holds if the 
spouse is unemployed. These results support the view that couples want to spend their leisure time 
together by synchronising their labour market states, favouring the assortative mating effect. 
6. Conclusions 
This analysis has found evidence of spousal spillover effects on the decision of elderly persons to 
continue participating in the labour force, although it varies across countries. Spillover effects have 
turned out to be significant, especially for the German sample. Additional evidence supports the 
existence of asymmetries of spousal effects across genders. There was more support for women than 
men having an effect on the labour force transitions of their elderly spouses. The effects are mostly 
shown through the wealth and participation variables of the spouse and spousal health effects were 
only found to impact German men. Although there is evidence of the added worker effect and the 
complementarities of leisure effect, the overall conclusion is that the latter hypothesis dominates. 
Further, there was no clear evidence of the assortative mating effect in our sample.  
As previously mentioned, spousal health effects were found to be significant for German men. The 
strongest effect supports the added worker hypothesis. A weaker effect shows, however, that if one’s 
wife has been hospitalised the probability of quitting work rises, which may be connected with care-
giving. That these results are only valid for Germany may have something to do with the different 
health care institutions in the countries studied. Additionally, the distinction between transitions from 
employment to other states of activity/inactivity is important as there are different routes out of 
employment. Certain determinants of labour supply seem to play varying roles in the different 
channels. For example, for Belgium the unemployment channel is not important at first glance.  
Transitions by the members of elderly two-adult households towards inactivity are influenced by 
important individual characteristics. Age plays a significant role, explaining the transitions as it is a 
crucial component for the eligibility and computation of benefits across the different types of 
inactivity. The impact of age effects is up to twice as strong for men as women. Yet it seems to play a 
much less important role on becoming unemployed. A second individual characteristic that has a 
significant impact on the probability of becoming inactive is the health status of the individual. A bad 
health condition has a large positive impact on the probability of an individual becoming inactive. 
Individuals who have become inactive are among those who use the disability path to retirement. The 
effect of bad health is especially significant for men and stronger for men than for women. The impact 
of bad health is insignificant, however, for the transition to unemployment. We found indirect 
evidence that men tend to retire more through the disability channel whereas women tend to flow out 
more often through the unemployment channel.  
A further very significant and robust result is that self-employed men and women have a higher 
probability of staying employed and a lower probability of becoming both unemployed and inactive. 
Ceteris paribus it is good for the labour force to encourage self-employment. Further, a higher degree 
of work experience is valuable to making a successful switch to self-employment. The more flexible 
working hours are also more appreciated by elderly couples. A policy conclusion here is that it may be 
worth stimulating self-employment for older two-adult households. The labour force participation of 
elderly self-employed persons is an area for further study.  
In line with the recent body of literature concentrating on the labour supply of couples, this study 
concludes that it is crucial to take into account the influence that spouses can have on the retirement 
decisions of each other, as not doing so may bias estimates of the determinants of retirement that can 
be used in policy simulation exercises. Useful extensions for future research can concentrate on the 
modelling of pension incentives and the endogeneity problems concerning health.  
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Appendix A 
Tables 
Table A.1. Summary statistics: Sample of working men aged 50 to 69 
male sample (age 50- age 69)
1497 obs. 2064 obs. 4273 obs.
Mean st-dev. Mean st-dev. Mean st-dev.
Outflow from employment 9.52% 0.93% 6.25% 0.68% 11.47% 0.68%
Transition to inactivity 0.71% 0.22% 2.46% 0.45% 3.59% 0.38%
Transition to unemployment 8.69% 0.90% 3.83% 0.52% 7.68% 0.57%
Age 54.68 0.10 54.29 0.10 55.78 0.09
Primary education 28.29% 1.33% 33.45% 1.45% 10.93% 0.62%
Secondary education 32.66% 1.43% 36.92% 1.44% 52.79% 1.10%
Tertiary education 36.06% 1.43% 29.23% 1.22% 36.08% 1.05%
Married 97.62% 0.40% 92.96% 0.84% 98.09% 0.22%
Cohabitation 99.79% 0.16% 99.89% 0.08% 99.92% 0.06%
Separation/divorce /widowhood 1.91% 0.34% 3.98% 0.68% 1.37% 0.19%
Children 0-13 3.75% 0.53% 10.01% 2.34% 9.87% 0.83%
Children 0-15 8.50% 0.80% 24.35% 3.69% 17.56% 1.10%
Household size 3.06 0.03 2.68 0.05 2.94 0.03
Non-national 4.87% 0.56% 1.17% 0.31% 9.35% 0.67%
Net annual salary/wage (10000 Euro's) 2.26 0.04 2.75 0.06 2.50 0.04
Gross annual salary/wage (10000 Euro's) 4.24 0.09 4.39 0.10 4.42 0.10
Capital income (10000 Euro's) 0.24 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.26 0.02
Owner occupied 92.55% 0.74% 86.76% 0.97% 66.58% 0.96%
Satisfaction with work (rising scale: 1 to 6) 4.57 0.04 3.99 0.06
Satisfaction with leisure (rising scale: 1to 6) 4.19 0.04 3.80 0.06
Low work status 40.57% 1.46% 47.83% 1.48%
High work status 22.08% 1.23% 23.25% 1.14%
Working experience 30.80 0.12 30.71 0.11 31.39 0.09
Hours (total, weekly) 42.52 0.30 41.59 0.31 42.90 0.21
Hours (main job, weekly) 41.93 0.30 41.00 0.31 42.56 0.21
Part time 2.27% 0.48% 5.66% 0.67% 0.30% 0.09%
Self employment 9.13% 0.86% 14.99% 0.96% 0.94% 0.19%
Public employment 25.18% 1.24% 28.60% 1.25% 26.23% 0.89%
Firm size < 20 14.46% 1.03% 33.80% 1.34% 13.00% 0.72%
Managers, professionals 26.53% 1.28% 26.01% 1.15% 27.40% 0.99%
Technicians 13.26% 1.03% 19.44% 1.08% 17.75% 0.89%
Clerks, service workers 15.22% 1.06% 6.77% 0.73% 10.13% 0.61%
Blue-collar worker 19.13% 1.17% 36.71% 1.51% 39.15% 1.05%
Health (declining scale: 1 to 5) 1.85 0.04 0.98 0.11 2.74 0.02
Bad health 1.19% 0.28% 3.77% 0.56% 16.74% 0.92%
Good health 81.44% 1.08% 49.62% 1.47% 39.33% 1.06%
Chronic physical/mental health problem 11.67% 0.92% 36.75% 1.36% 39.54% 1.10%
Limitation 10.70% 0.87% 22.81% 1.19% 36.70% 1.09%
Inpatient at a hospital 9.52% 0.83% 10.22% 0.75% 9.63% 0.65%
Hospital nights 0.60 0.13 0.54 0.06 1.50 0.14
1-5 visits to the doctor 55.44% 1.48% 63.15% 1.38%
6+ visits to the doctor 35.58% 1.42% 25.28% 1.22%
Spouse age difference 1.82 0.10 2.03 0.11 2.60 0.08
Spouse capital income (10000 Euro's) 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00
Spouse annual net wages (10000 Euro's) 0.52 0.03 1.52 0.04 0.59 0.02
Spouse Old-age benefit receiver 8.07% 0.75% 7.21% 0.66% 4.65% 0.45%
Spouse Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver 6.80% 0.71% 18.19% 1.08% 2.47% 0.27%
Spouse inpatient at hospital 10.76% 1.00% 11.87% 1.03% 11.12% 0.70%
Spouse inactive 49.68% 1.50% 14.69% 1.22% 47.65% 1.11%
Spouse unemployed 8.67% 0.88% 7.59% 0.74% 7.04% 0.51%
Belgium Finland Germany
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Table A.2. Summary statistics: Sample of working women aged 50 to 69 
female sample (age 50- age 69)
633 obs. 1920 obs. 2640 obs.
Mean st-dev. Mean st-dev. Mean st-dev.
Outflow from employment 8,61 % 1,27 % 6,42 % 0,63 % 14,73 % 1,30 %
Transition to inactivity 1,95 % 0,67 % 3,00 % 0,44 % 5,19 % 1,02 %
Transition to unemployment 7,40 % 1,15 % 3,44 % 0,46 % 8,99 % 0,91 %
Age 53,38 0,13 54,29 0,10 54,87 0,13
Primary education 20,10 % 1,70 % 36,00 % 1,38 % 26,34 % 1,41 %
Secondary education 35,95 % 2,19 % 32,91 % 1,37 % 58,15 % 1,56 %
Tertiary education 38,84 % 2,18 % 30,93 % 1,23 % 15,36 % 0,97 %
Married 95,88 % 0,80 % 93,47 % 0,74 % 96,95 % 0,39 %
Cohabitation 100,00 % 0,00 % 99,94 % 0,05 % 99,91 % 0,06 %
Separation/divorce /widowhood 2,46 % 0,60 % 4,18 % 0,60 % 2,84 % 0,38 %
Children 0-13 0,41 % 0,24 % 3,91 % 0,56 % 3,71 % 0,69 %
Children 0-15 3,19 % 0,70 % 9,67 % 0,87 % 4,63 % 0,72 %
Household size 2,74 0,04 2,47 0,02 2,56 0,04
Non-national 2,86 % 0,69 % 0,73 % 0,23 % 7,16 % 0,59 %
Net annual salary/wage (10000 Euro's) 1,43 0,04 2,04 0,03 1,21 0,03
Gross annual salary/wage (10000 Euro's) 2,68 0,07 3,08 0,05 2,07 0,04
Capital income (10000 Euro's) 0,19 0,04 0,10 0,02 0,03 0,01
Owner occupied 91,06 % 1,34 % 88,00 % 1,00 % 58,50 % 1,54 %
Satisfaction with work (rising scale: 1 to 6) 4,56 0,06 4,43 0,04
Satisfaction with leisure (rising scale: 1to 6) 4,02 0,06 4,24 0,04
Low work status 65,74 % 2,12 % 67,84 % 1,28 %
High work status 8,00 % 1,34 % 8,27 % 0,75 %
Working experience 29,22 0,17 30,76 0,11 31,36 0,15
Hours (total, weekly) 33,04 0,51 37,94 0,28 32,68 0,35
Hours (main job, weekly) 32,93 0,50 37,07 0,25 32,40 0,34
Part time 26,45 % 2,03 % 11,63 % 0,88 % 19,84 % 1,31 %
Self employment 4,90 % 0,81 % 5,33 % 0,53 % 0,37 % 0,12 %
Public employment 40,17 % 2,15 % 57,09 % 1,40 % 33,49 % 1,34 %
Firm size < 20 14,92 % 1,66 % 40,51 % 1,42 % 26,69 % 1,48 %
Managers, professionals 25,26 % 1,96 % 21,63 % 1,05 % 10,06 % 0,75 %
Technicians 11,44 % 1,28 % 16,42 % 1,05 % 21,83 % 1,23 %
Clerks, service workers 32,01 % 2,13 % 40,63 % 1,41 % 37,36 % 1,67 %
Blue-collar worker 7,27 % 1,08 % 14,31 % 1,07 % 22,96 % 1,35 %
Health (declining scale: 1 to 5) 1,92 0,05 1,82 0,07 2,75 0,03
Bad health 0,95 % 0,47 % 4,68 % 0,55 % 17,20 % 1,03 %
Good health 78,87 % 1,75 % 53,06 % 1,41 % 40,31 % 1,68 %
Chronic physical/mental health problem 8,94 % 1,32 % 38,86 % 1,38 % 38,64 % 1,47 %
Limitation 8,31 % 1,23 % 25,52 % 1,24 % 37,30 % 1,45 %
Inpatient at a hospital 10,13 % 1,38 % 11,78 % 0,97 % 9,38 % 0,83 %
Hospital nights 0,48 0,13 0,50 0,06 1,09 0,13
1-5 visits to the doctor 44,62 % 2,21 % 55,48 % 1,41 %
6+ visits to the doctor 50,94 % 2,23 % 38,16 % 1,38 %
Spouse age difference -1,64 0,14 -1,76 0,12 -2,92 0,10
Spouse capital income (10000 Euro's) 0,73 0,25 0,27 0,07 0,18 0,03
Spouse annual net wages (10000 Euro's) 1,79 0,09 1,75 0,06 1,11 0,05
Spouse Old-age benefit receiver 15,02 % 1,61 % 16,36 % 0,98 % 22,98 % 1,67 %
Spouse Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver 7,09 % 1,22 % 24,92 % 1,26 % 5,74 % 0,57 %
Spouse inpatient at hospital 11,49 % 1,46 % 11,70 % 0,84 % 10,72 % 0,79 %
Spouse inactive 16,24 % 1,65 % 26,80 % 1,28 % 33,95 % 1,75 %
Spouse unemployed 3,51 % 0,75 % 6,54 % 0,65 % 7,74 % 0,71 %
Finland Germany Belgium
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
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Table A.3. Multinomial logit model estimates for male members of elderly two-adult households in 
Finland 
M.E. z-value M.E. z-value M.E. z-value
Age 0.0013346 1.47 0.0047257 5.13 -0.0060603 -4.55
Married 0.0174714 3.49 0.0111841 2.63 -0.0286555 -4.24
Number of children 0-13 -0.0003347 -0.06 -0.0129073 -1.43 0.013242 1.25
Tertiary education 0.0036656 0.38  -0.0053085 -0.86 0.0016429 0.14
Inpatient at hospital 0.0090499 0.95 0.0000957 0.01 -0.0091456 -0.79
Bad health 0.0013173 0.08 0.1281217 2.41 -0.1294389 -2.40
Annual net wages -0.0103675 -3.07  -0.0026507 -0.81 0.0130182 2.73
Capital income 0.0036755 2.52 0.0004175 0.26 -0.0040931 -1.77
Satisfaction with work -0.0047472 -1.86 0.000641 0.26 0.0041062 1.09
Satisfaction with leisure 0.0049897 1.92 -0.0008456 -0.35 -0.004144 -1.15
Supervisory job status -0.0056911 -0.88 -0.0088991 -1.55 0.0145902 1.63
Part time -0.0137071 -2.86 0.0197593 1.18 -0.0060522 -0.33
Self employment status -0.0170636 -2.60 -0.0124557 -2.57 0.0295194 3.52
Public employment -0.0036107 -0.53 0.0104222 1.62 -0.0068115 -0.71
Firm size < 20 0.0026077 0.39 0.0016282 0.31 -0.004236 -0.47
Managers, professionals 0.0023867 0.16 -0.0036584 -0.44 0.0012717 0.07
Technicians -0.0025928 -0.37 -0.0047753 -0.93 0.0073681 0.82
Clerks, service workers -0.003407 -0.35 0.0047159 0.41 -0.001309 -0.09
Spouse age difference -0.0005852 -0.79 0.0005131 0.72 0.0000722 0.07
Spouse capital income -0.0024529 -0.36 0.0017553 3.27 0.0006975 0.10
Spouse annual net wages 0.004003 1.26 0.000786 0.28 -0.0047889 -1.10
Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver 0.0083112 0.92 0.001457 0.23 -0.0097681 -0.88
Spouse inpatient at hospital 0.006243 0.55 -0.0012251 -0.20 -0.0050179 -0.39
Spouse inactive 0.0316789 1.58 0.0183483 1.14 -0.0500272 -1.89
Spouse unemployed 0.0369563 1.19 0.0231289 1.15 -0.0600852 -1.59
Year 1996 0.0261038 1.30 0.0022157 0.26 -0.0283196 -1.31
Year 1997 0.0157445 0.94 0.017127 1.50 -0.0328715 -1.65
Year 1998 0.0136193 0.84 0.0109535 0.98 -0.0245728 -1.25
Year 1999 0.0365331 1.43 0.0124622 1.03 -0.0489953 -1.72
Observations 1541 47 92 1402
Percent correctly predicted 91.48
Log likelihood -383.93
Pseudo R-squared 0.2766
unemployed inactive employed
Men
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
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Table A.4. Multinomial logit model estimates for female members of elderly two-adult households in 
Finland 
M.E. z-value M.E. z-value M.E. z-value
Age 0.0004662 0.81 0.0034576 4.01 -.0039238 -3.69
Married 0.0063802 1.19 0.0071139 2.36 -0.0134941 -2.18
Number of children 0-13 -0.0003315 -0.05 0.015237 2.34 -0.0149055 -1.24
Tertiary education -0.0061538 -1.10 -0.0078526 -2.14 -.0140064 2.00
Inpatient at hospital 0.0008543 0.16 0.0057264 0.99 -0.0065807 -0.84
Bad health 0.0039042 0.41 0.025735 1.59 -0.0296392 -1.71
Annual net wages  -0.0206373 -3.92 -0.0048009 -1.14 0.0254382 3.91
Capital income -0.005272 -0.45 0.001205 2.61 0.0040671 0.35
Satisfaction with work -0.0023923 -1.32 0.0011699 0.79 0.0012224 0.51
Satisfaction with leisure 0.0028176 1.69 0.0013096 0.97 -0.0041273 -1.86
Supervisory job status -0.0068643 -1.09 0.0007707 0.12 0.0060936 0.71
Part time -0.0075088 -2.35 0.0001465 0.03 0.0073622 1.38
Self employment status -0.0130526 -2.91 -0.0070019 -2.33 0.0200545 3.70
Public employment -0.006093 -1.40 0.0033129 1.09 0.0027801 0.52
Firm size < 20 0.0080796 1.76 -0.0017694 -0.60 -0.0063102 -1.13
Managers, professionals 0.0250863 0.91 0.0246661 1.23 -0.0497523 -1.54
Technicians 0.0577785 1.81 0.0025032 0.43 -0.0602817 -1.86
Clerks, service workers 0.0181498 1.82 -0.0021636 -0.57 -0.0159862 -1.47
Spouse age difference 0.000214 0.41 0.0002458 0.67 -0.0004598 -0.72
Spouse capital income 0.0010006 0.60 -0.0006591 -1.47 -0.0003415 -0.20
Spouse annual net wages -0.0008912 -0.59 -0.0007672 -0.58 0.0016585 0.81
Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver -0.0013499 -0.31 0.0029552 0.67 -0.0016053 -0.25
Spouse inpatient at hospital -0.0043124 -1.12 -0.0009207 -0.29 0.0052331 1.06
Spouse inactive -0.0022948 -0.42 0.0039157 0.71 -0.0016209 -0.20
Spouse unemployed -0.0104079 1.02 -0.0013419 -0.33 -0.009066 -0.83
Year 1996 0.0058375 0.83 -0.0041841 -1.51 -0.0016534 -0.22
Year 1997 -0.0024725 -0.51 0.0024083 0.50 0.0000642 0.01
Year 1998 0.0035325 0.63 -0.0013132 -0.33 -0.0022193 -0.32
Year 1999 -0.003217 -0.67 -0.0030803 -0.93 0.0062973 1.12
Observations 1470 60 75 1335
Percent correctly predicted 92.14
Log likelihood -332.63468
Pseudo R-squared 0.3175
Women
unemployed inactive employed
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
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Table A.5. Multinomial logit model estimates for male members of elderly two-adult households in 
Germany 
M.E. z-value M.E. z-value M.E. z-value
Age 0.0004536 0.92 0.0094001 5.24 -0.0098537 -5.33
Married -0.0193902 -1.59 -0.0332984 -0.66 0.0526886 0.96
Number of children 0-13 0.0056198 1.12 -0.0307417 -1.40 0.0251219 1.12
Tertiary education 0.0108298 1.88 0.0075139 0.71 -0.0183437 -1.47
Inpatient at hospital -0.0022896 -0.66 0.0292056 1.99 -0.026916 -1.76
Bad health 0.001839 0.55 0.0390211 2.72  -0.0408601 -2.72
Annual net wages -0.0184659 -7.61 -0.0377942 -5.67 0.0562601 7.57
Capital income 0.0010685 0.75 0.0065242 4.90 -0.0075927 -3.74
Part time -0.0144425 -4.80 -0.0096802 -0.21 0.0241227 0.52
Self employment status -0.0129103 -4.90 -0.0384198 -4.98 0.0513302 6.15
Public employment -0.0054964 -1.75 0.0019119 0.21 0.0035845 0.36
Firm size < 20 0.0024129 0.51 -0.0157704 -1.80 0.0133576 1.32
Managers, professionals -0.002827 -0.68 0.0233218 1.59 -0.0204948 -1.29
Technicians -0.0027092 -0.66 0.0032807 0.26 -0.0005716 -0.04
Clerks, service workers -0.0071886 -2.29 0.0221194 1.34 -0.0149308 -0.86
Spouse age difference -0.0000722 -0.17 0.0004074 0.38 -0.0003353 -0.27
Spouse capital income 0.0045654 2.07 -0.0302107 -0.52 0.0256452 0.45
Spouse annual net wages -0.0067104 -2.46 -0.004854 -0.50 0.0115644 1.11
Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver 0.0115463 1.16 -0.02188 -2.47 0.0103337 0.84
Spouse inpatient at hospital 0.0016662 0.44 0.0232261 1.73 -0.0248923 -1.76
Spouse inactive -0.0006873 -0.15 0.0162398 1.00 -0.0155525 -0.87
Spouse unemployed 0.004478 0.72 0.0041498 0.23 -0.0086278 -0.43
Year 1994 -0.0088694 -2.40 0.03412 1.45 -0.0252507 -1.07
Year 1995 -0.0069201 -1.68 0.039249 1.80 -0.0323289 -1.44
Year 1996 -0.0032755 -0.66 0.0057169 0.37 -0.0024415 -0.15
Year 1997 -0.0051058 -1.15 -0.0097715 -0.77 0.0148773 1.07
Year 1998 -0.0034706 -0.67 0.0219758 1.15 -0.0185053 -0.92
Year 1999 -0.0056961 -1.15 0.000006 0.00 0.0056899 0.37
Observations 3632 198 299 3135
Percent correctly predicted 87.44
Log likelihood -1322.2668
Pseudo R-squared 0.2223
Men
unemployed inactive employed
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Table A.6. Multinomial logit model estimates for female members of elderly two-adult households in 
Germany 
M.E. z-value M.E. z-value M.E. z-value
Age -0.0006239 -0.64 0.0044312 2.16 -0.0038074 -1.47
Married 0.0030548 0.29 -0.0469918 -0.88 0.043937 0.82
Number of children 0-13 -0.0007902 -0.07 -0.0123368 -0.55 0.013127 0.44
Tertiary education 0.0142608 1.26 0.0128787 0.99 -0.0271394 -1.51
Inpatient at hospital 0.0011507 0.16 0.023257 1.36 -0.0244077 -1.24
Bad health 0.0067005 0.73 0.0336701 2.39 -0.0403706 -2.28
Annual net wages -0.0608455 -3.91 -0.0995314 -6.09 0.160377 6.34
Capital income 0.0180243 1.13 0.0666898 1.78 -0.0847141 -1.75
Part time -0.0261276 -3.02 -0.0013075 -0.13 0.0274351 1.95
Self employment status -0.0176863 -2.46 -0.0112088 -0.40 0.0288951 0.97
Public employment 0.0163432 1.92 0.0178503 1.72 -0.0341935 -2.63
Firm size < 20 -0.0129495 -2.42 -0.00563 -0.46 0.0185795 1.25
Managers, professionals 0.0272733 1.31 0.0093263 0.31 -0.0365996 -0.87
Technicians 0.0034596 0.40 0.0432573 1.81 -0.046717 -1.75
Clerks, service workers 0.0059465 0.87 0.0216843 1.32 -0.0276308 -1.51
Spouse age difference 0.0005986 0.66 -0.0001056 -0.07 -0.000493 -0.26
Spouse capital income -0.0452474 -1.85 0.0052376 1.81 0.0400098 1.61
Spouse annual net wages 0.0002226 0.06 -0.0021522 -0.58 0.0019296 0.43
Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver 0.0122339 0.88 -0.0140121 -0.97 0.0017782 0.09
Spouse inpatient at hospital 0.0019609 0.24 0.006558 0.43 -0.0085189 -0.47
Spouse inactive 0.0212058 1.83 0.0031933 0.23 -0.0243991 -1.21
Spouse unemployed 0.0200562 1.20 0.0002273 0.02 -0.0202835 -0.90
Year 1994 -0.0074483 -0.94 0.0105412 0.50 -0.0030929 -0.13
Year 1995 -0.0116749 -1.92 0.0262476 1.11 -0.0145727 -0.59
Year 1996 -0.0076368 -0.85 0.0092326 0.51 -0.0015958 -0.08
Year 1997 -0.0147547 -2.47 0.0113084 0.60 0.0034463 0.17
Year 1998 -0.0131342 -2.05 0.0048918 0.32 0.0082424 0.45
Year 1999 -0.0157989 -2.21 0.0146234 0.72 0.0011754 0.05
Observations 2217 143 185 1889
Percent correctly predicted 86.94
Log likelihood -864.92889  
Pseudo R-squared 0.2847
Women
unemployed inactive employed
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Table A.7. Probit model estimates of the determinants of the outflow from employment of male and 
female members of elderly two-adult households in Belgium 
M.E. z-value M.E. z-value
Age 0.0157052 8.60 0.0116195 3.32
Married -0.1074019 -2.23 -0.0530992 -0.72
Number of children 0-13 -0.0090597 -0.27
Tertiary education -0.0006404 -0.04 0.0937736 2.44
Inpatient at hospital -0.0019337 -0.11 0.0619283 1.29
Bad health -0.0033712 -0.06 -0.041541 -0.82
Annual net wages -0.0529514 -2.93 -0.105082 -3.91
Capital income 0.0123591 2.22 -0.0001296 -0.01
Satisfaction with work -0.0123736 -2.41 -0.0191479 -2.93
Satisfaction with leisure 0.0051204 0.97 0.0118374 1.57
Supervisory job status 0.0053513 0.25 0.1236832 1.58
Part time 0.0136584 0.33 -0.0270052 -1.21
Self employment status -0.0732105 -4.78 -0.0235071 -0.59
Public employment -0.0163961 -1.14 -0.0357231 -1.53
Firm size < 20 -0.0302968 -1.88 -0.0001182 -0.00
Managers, professionals -0.0186661 -1.00 -0.0405894 -1.25
Technicians -0.017942 -0.90 -0.0581662 -2.36
Clerks, service workers -0.031151 -1.83 -0.0512308 -2.10
Spouse age difference -0.0014225 -0.61 -0.0031216 -0.84
Spouse capital income -0.0207268 -0.87 -0.0099949 -1.40
Spouse annual net wages 0.0017559 0.14 0.001104 0.13
Sickness-invalidity benefit receiver 0.0030577 0.12 -0.0067334 -0.21
Spouse inpatient at hospital 0.0020888 0.10 0.0320663 0.91
Spouse inactive 0.0433715 2.16 -0.0149681 -0.42
Spouse unemployed 0-.0088371 -0.31 0.1280286 1.99
Year 1994 0.020296 0.60 0.0886269 1.32
Year 1995 -0.0018015 -0.08 0.0879575 1.26
Year 1996 0.0323635 0.96 0.0644971 0.99
Year 1997 0.0648588 1.67 0.0609431 0.98
Year 1998 0.0502341 1.28 0.1544637 1.91
Year 1999 0.0180968 0.51 -0.0271042 -0.83
Observations 1186 493
Percent correctly predicted 89.93 86.96
Log likelihood -308.38704 -131.87271
Pseudo R-squared 0.2685 0.2290
Men Women
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP (1994-2001). 
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Appendix B 
Figures 
Figure A.1. Age profile of the outflow and synchronised outflow from employment per country (left) 
and age profile of the outflow to inactivity and unemployment 
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Figure A.2. Kaplan-Meier survivor functions per country: A comparison of men and women, and 
tertiary education versus lower education levels 
Finland (men versus women)  Finland (tertiary education) 
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Figure A.3. Kaplan-Meier survivor functions per country: A comparison of bad health with good and 
fair health and limitation versus non-limitation 
Finland (bad health)  Finland (limitation) 
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Figure A.4. Kaplan-Meier survivor functions per country: A comparison between persons who are 
disabled vs. non-disabled and between persons who have been hospitalised vs. not 
hospitalised 
Finland (disable)  Finland (hospital) 
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Appendix C 
Description of the Belgian, Finnish and German Pension Systems 
Pension systems are dynamic. The summary of the pension systems of our sample countries 
concentrates on a brief description of the systems during the sample period years of 4 to 2000. Since 
1994 different pension reforms have taken place, along with those after the year 2000. For a more 
detailed description and updates of the most recent changes, see the Bibliography. 
C.1.  The pension system in Belgium 
C.1.1. Structure 
The Belgian pension system consists of three pillars. The first pillar unites social security pensions 
and is compulsory for all employees, civil servants and self-employed persons. It is financed by 
current income (pay-as-you-go or PAYG). The second pillar is employer-employee funded and 
embraces non-compulsory occupational schemes covering about 31% of the working population of the 
private sector in 1997.
1 The third pillar includes private-funded pension schemes and was in 2000 
used by 44% of Flemish private-sector workers (OECD, 2003). Further description of the system 
concentrates on this most important first pillar. Civil servants are covered by a special state scheme 
and private-sector employees and self-employed persons by two different social security schemes. 
Private-sector employees account for 58% of all compulsory schemes, civil servants for 32% and the 
self-employed for 9%, along with a guaranteed minimum pension system for the elderly accounting 
for 1%. All three major groups have their own pension rules. A brief description of basic 
characteristics per group follows. 
C.1.2.  Employees (private sector) 
The conditions for obtaining a full pension for men is being the minimum age of 65 and having a 
working career of at least 45 years. Women can obtain a full pension after a career of 42 years from 
the age of 62 onwards. In 1997 men and women could go on their pension from age 60 if their career 
had reached a minimum of 20 years. It is notable that the gross replacement rate of the average worker 
in the private sector amounted to 29.9% in 2000. The calculation of pension benefits is based on the 
following formula:   
Benefit = r*average wage*min[d/(42 or 45),1] 
and consequently depends on 1) the replacement rate r depending on the reported type of household – 
0.6 for singles and 0.75 for a one-earner couple; 2) average earnings based on periods of affiliation; 
and 3) the share of years completed of the full career (42 years for women and 45 years for men). The 
average wage corresponds to the price-indexed average wages over the period of affiliation. An 
important characteristic of this scheme is that periods spent in unemployment, inactivity due to 
sickness and disability, or early retirement also counts as affiliation years in the computation of the 
average wage and hence of the pension benefit. All benefits in this scheme are consumer price-
indexed. 
In this system pension benefits are limited at both ends: for a complete career the minimum annual 
pension was €11,794 for a one-earner couple or €9,438 for individuals in February 2002 (about 56% 
of average net wages). The earnings entering the above pension formula had a ceiling of €38,678 
(120% of the average gross wage) in 2001. If the ceiling is adapted for the whole career the maximum 
annual pension amounted to €20,894 for a one-earner couple and €16,715 for an individual in 2001. 
                                                 
1 Information in this section draws from the European Commission’s website on pension matters 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_protection/pensions_en.htm).  LABOUR FORCE BEHAVIOUR OF MEN AND WOMEN IN ELDERLY TWO-ADULT HOUSEHOLDS | 31 
Unemployment pension. Next to the official wage-earner scheme, several forms of early retirement 
programmes have recently developed, some being official early retirement schemes, others 
(unemployment, disability and sickness) being unofficial. These schemes can be broadly divided into 
two groups, mandatory collective retirement and individual retirement. Individual early retirement 
differentiates itself from its collective counterpart by the fact that it is based on an individual’s 
decision to retire from work. The most prevalent way to exercise this option is to pass through the 
unemployment system, in which people aged 50 or more are considered ‘aged unemployed’, and are 
not being required to actively seek work.  
Disability pension. Some individuals also attempt to proceed to retirement through the disability 
insurance scheme. In the Belgian context this channel is not very prominent for private-sector workers 
as control is fierce and benefits are rather limited. 
C.1.3.  Civil servants (public sector) 
The conditions for obtaining a full pension for civil servants (both men and women) is being the 
minimum age of 65 and having a working career of at least 45 years. Men and women can obtain a 
pension from the age of 60 if they contributed to the pension system for at least five years. The gross 
replacement rate of the average worker in the public sector was 65.4% in 2000. Benefits are computed 
according to a rather complicated formula:   
Benefit = average gross wage over last five years of career*min[fraction,0.75]. 
Pension benefits are based on the average gross wages of the last five years of the career and can never 
exceed 75% of that average wage. The ‘fraction’ variable in the benefit formula has a numerator 
consisting of the number of years the person worked in the public sector and a denominator that is the 
benefit accrual factor. This latter benefit-accrual factor, also called ‘tantième’, depends on the rank 
occupied in the hierarchy. 
For a complete career the minimum annual pension was €14,344 for one-earner couples (70% of 
average wages) or €11,475 for individuals (56% of average wages) in February 2002. The maximum 
pension amounted to 75% of the five-year average wage. The annual ceiling of the gross pension was 
€61,000 in 2002 (about three times the average gross wage in the economy). Public pensions are 
indexed to the average wages (préréquation). 
Aside from the official route of retirement, public servants can quit work early through disability 
protection. This early retirement route seems to be much more plausible for employees from the public 
sector than for those of the private sector as the screening is less stringent. The calculation of 
invalidity pension is based on foregone earnings with a ceiling of €2,480 per month (January 2001) 
and a rate of 65% for a single-earner couple, 45% for an individual and 40% for a cohabitant. 
C.1.4. Self-employed  persons 
The self-employed retirement scheme is less generous than those of the public and private sectors. The 
conditions for obtaining a full pension are the same as in the private sector. In 1997 men and women 
can go on their pension from age 60 if their career had reached 20 years. The pension is reduced, 
however, by 5% for each year of anticipation. The net replacement rate of an average self-employed 
person was 23.6% in 2000.  
Since 1984 the pension has depended on net profits and the duration of the career. A full career is 
defined the same way as in the private sector. For a complete career the minimum annual pension was 
€9,401 for one-earner couples or €7,051 for individuals in February 2002. The annual ceiling of 
income that enters the benefit formula was €49,077 for 2001. 
Self-employed persons do not have access to the unemployment insurance system and there is no other 
special regime they could use to retire early. Although there is a public disability system, the 32 | MATTHIAS DESCHRYVERE  
application of more stringent criteria than that applied in the private sector prevents it from becoming 
a ‘well-loved’ early retirement channel. As Dellis et al. (2001) note, self-employed persons wishing to 
retire early are somehow forced to exercise this option through some private transit retirement-income 
arrangement. 
C.2.  The pension system in Finland 
C.2.1. Structure 
The three pillars of the Finnish pension system include the following provisions. In the first pillar, 
every citizen resident in Finland is compulsorily insured under the basic state pension scheme (the so-
called ‘national’ pension) from the age of 16. This pension is means-tested against the occupational 
pension. In Finland the first pillar consists of both the statuary occupational scheme and the national 
pension scheme.  
In the second pillar it is possible for the employer to set up voluntary, occupational pension schemes. 
As regards voluntary pensions, the employer is responsible for at least 50% of the contributions. The 
additional pension systems play a minor role in Finland. Voluntary occupational schemes may be 
arranged in pension funds, foundations and in life insurance companies. An employer may set up a 
fund of its own if the scheme has at least 300 members or a foundation if the scheme has at least 30 
members. In the third pillar, individuals can arrange for private pensions, which are administered by 
insurance companies. Private pension schemes are operated on a funded basis.  
In what follows we concentrate on pillar 1 – first on the state pension scheme but mainly on the 
compulsory occupational scheme. 
The state pension scheme 
The state pension scheme is funded on a PAYG basis. As of 2000 the employer contributed from 2.4 
to 4.9% of the salary. There is no maximum salary up to which contributions must be paid. The 
retirement age for men and women is 65. If the pension is deferred, it increases by 0.6% per month. 
Early retirement is possible from the age of 60. The pension is reduced by 0.4% per month before the 
age of 65. A full pension is received when the pensioner has been resident for 40 years. The pension 
will be reduced for every year of residence less than 40 years. The amount of pension does not only 
depend on the years of residence, but also on the place of residence, family status and income from 
occupational pension schemes. 
The compulsory occupational scheme 
The compulsory occupational pension system is a defined-benefit scheme. Different schemes apply to 
different categories of persons. There are occupational pension schemes on both a PAYG and a funded 
basis. The financing of the occupational scheme for employees is a mixture of both. Occupational 
pensions for self-employed persons and agricultural workers are financed on a PAYG basis. As of 
2000, the total contribution of the employee and the employer to the compulsory pension was on 
average 21.5% of the salary. The employee contributed 4.7% of the salary. There is no maximum up 
to which contributions must be paid.  
The retirement age for men and women is 65. Early retirement is possible, and the pension is reduced 
accordingly. In voluntary occupational schemes the employer may reduce the retirement age from 65 
to 55. Compulsory occupational schemes (pillar 1) must be arranged in one of the following pension 
institutions: pension insurance companies (6), pension funds (8) and pension foundations (about 40). LABOUR FORCE BEHAVIOUR OF MEN AND WOMEN IN ELDERLY TWO-ADULT HOUSEHOLDS | 33 
C.2.2.  Employees (private sector) 
Old-age pensions. Earning-related pensions depend on accrued pension rights during (self-) 
employment. Benefits from this type of pension are based upon three main factors: 
1)  the number of years in employment; 
2)  the accrual rate (the pension starts growing from the age of 23) – for the years prior to 1962 an 
employee has acquired a pension rate of 0.5% per year and for the years following 1962 the 
pension rate has been 1.5% per year. From the age of 60 onwards an employee acquires a 
pension rate of 2.5%. Thus, the maximum pension is 60% of the highest wage; and 
3)  the principle that pensionable salary is the gross income net of an employee's pension 
contributions and corresponds to the average salary of the last 10 years of occupation. Although 
the maximum pension is 60% of the highest income during the career, there is no upper limit for 
the amount of pension received. Indexation to the current date of the pension rights at the end of 
the career is 50% wages and 50% inflation.  
If an individual works beyond age 65 no pension rights can be accrued on this income but this gives 
rise to an increase of pension entitlements of 0.6% per month. It is possible to retire completely from 
the age of 60. Then the level of pension payments is subject to an actuarial reduction of 0.4% for every 
month below age 65. The calculation is as follows: 
Benefit= pensionable salary*years of employment*accrual rate. 
For the average Finnish worker incentives to continue working are low and the net replacement rates 
are flat. From the age of 63 the replacement rate of 62% increases only 2 percentage points at the age 
of 65 and 3 percentage points at the age of 70. So working seven years longer only brings a rise of 5 
percentage points. Similarly the Finnish pension wealth-accrual turns negative at age 63 (-20%) and is 
stabilised after -70%. For the average Finnish worker the net replacement rates for the disability 
pension are very flat at around 65% and the net replacement rates for the unemployment benefits have 
a similar flat pattern at around 65%. 
Unemployment pension. In Finland (2001) the unemployment pension (at 20%) is together with 
disability pension (at 33%) the most common way to exit the labour market for the age category of 60 
to 64. The basic unemployment allowance was €115 per week in 2003 and is means-tested against 
spouse income over a certain limit. The earnings-related unemployment allowance equals 45% (+ 
20%) of the difference between the former income up to a ceiling (over the ceiling) and the basic 
allowance. We see much higher unemployment rates for people over age 55 in the administrative data 
than in the labour force survey; this is an effect of the so-called ‘unemployment tunnel’, which leads to 
the unemployment pension at the age of 60 for persons in the age group of 60-64 who have received 
unemployment allowances for a maximum of 500 days and have been employed at least five years 
during the previous 15 years and are eligible for the ‘unemployment’ pension. This pension is received 
up to the age of 65 when an old age pension is then received. In practice, persons aged 57, after being 
on ordinary unemployment benefits for two years, can have their benefits extended to age 60. Thus the 
unemployment pension effectively starts at age 55. This explains the sharp drop in unemployment 
rates between ages 59 and 61. Recipients of unemployment pensions (as a percentage of the 
population aged 60-64) varied from 18% in 1994 to 21% in 2000.  
Disability pension. Ordinary disability pensions in Finland can be applied for by persons aged 
between 16 and 65 and can be granted for long or short periods. A special pension in this category is 
called the ‘individual early retirement pension’ and is payable to persons aged 60 to 64 whose capacity 
has been permanently reduced (awarded on less-stringent medical criteria). In 2001, 11%of those aged 
50-54 received a disability pension, as did 20% of those aged 55-59 and 33% of those aged 60-64. 
Finland has one of the highest incidences of disability among older persons. Therefore it seems 
plausible that this is partly an unofficial retirement channel.   34 | MATTHIAS DESCHRYVERE  
C.2.3. Public  sector 
As to their main provisions, the public-sector pension acts conform to the private-sector TEL 
(compulsory) scheme. In 1993-95 major changes to the pension acts were implemented in all public-
sector pension schemes, with the aim of harmonising the pension legislation with the private-sector 
TEL scheme. The full effect of the changes only concerns persons who have come into public-sector 
employment for the first time after 1992. The changes take effect gradually. Before the reform the 
public-sector pension clearly accrued faster than that of the private sector. A pension has been able to 
accrue at a rate of 2.2% of the wage, with the target level of 66% achievable in 30 years. Also the 
retirement age (63 years) has been lower than in the private sector. In addition, the public sector has 
had numerous industry- and occupation-specific retirement ages that are lower. Thus, insured 
individuals who were in public-sector employment before the legislative changes, depending on their 
age and the duration of the employment contract, either retained all or part of their previous pension 
benefits (at the 2.2% accrual rate, lower retirement age and a maximum level of 66%) or at least their 
higher accrual rates up to the legislative changes. 
C.2.4. Self-employed  persons 
The national pension scheme is valid for the self-employed in the same way as for all other population 
groups. For the earnings-related pension scheme special pension provisions apply to self-employed 
persons (Self-Employed Persons’ Pensions Act or YEL) and farmers (MYEL, the Farmers’ Pensions 
Act). The insured are self-employed persons aged 18 to 64. The higher age limit for self-employed 
persons is due to the fact that only a person who has come of age can take out a self-employed 
person’s pension insurance. Entrepreneurs other than farmers can choose the pension provider with 
which they take out pension insurance. Personal pension schemes are typically more frequent among 
self-employed persons than among employees. According to a study carried out in 2001, 25% of self-
employed persons had a personal pension scheme, whereas not quite 10% of employees had such 
insurance. 
C.3.  The pension system in Germany 
C.3.1. Structure   
The German pension system consists of three pillars: 1) public retirement insurance, 2) occupational 
schemes and 3) individual provisions. The German system is very dependent on the first pillar and 
pension reforms in 2001 aimed at expanding the second and third pillars. Major pension reform had 
also occurred in 1992, followed by minor reform in 1999. In 1995 the benefit shares per pillar of the 
total benefits were as follows: 71% from the first pillar, 7% from the second pillar and 22% from the 
third pillar. We briefly describe the three pillars and then go into more detail about the first pillar. 
Under the first pillar, the public retirement insurance is PAYG-funded and compulsory for a vast 
majority of the people (except for self-employed persons and until 1998 for workers with earnings 
below the official minimum earnings threshold, which is 15% of the average monthly gross wage). 
This first pillar covers about 85% of the German workforce. Most of those covered work in the private 
sector, although some are public-sector workers who are not civil servants. Civil servants (about 7% of 
the workforce) have their own pension system. The self-employed (about 9% of the work force) are 
mainly self-insured although some of them participate in the public retirement-insurance system. For 
the  second pillar, there are four different forms of occupational pension provision: 1) direct 
entitlements, 2) pension funds, 3) support funds and 4) direct insurance. Direct entitlements – a form 
of direct benefit schemes – are the main way of financing pension schemes in large firms. Direct 
insurance is becoming popular in small firms. About 50% of the labour force is covered by 
occupational pension schemes. As far as employees are concerned, the larger the company, the more 
likely you are to receive a supplementary pension. In the third pillar, the individual provisions 
involve the principle that any form of private assets may be used to secure a reasonable standard of LABOUR FORCE BEHAVIOUR OF MEN AND WOMEN IN ELDERLY TWO-ADULT HOUSEHOLDS | 35 
living in old age. Property is by far the most important form of private provision. Real estate 
represents two-thirds of private assets, compared with life insurance, for example, which represents 
only 7% (European Commission, 2000). 
C.3.2.  Employees (private sector) 
Old-age pensions. The legal retirement age is 65. Nevertheless, German public-retirement insurance 
provides old-age pensions for workers aged 60 and older (the law allows certain groups to draw a 
pension early: women, the unemployed, the seriously disabled and persons who have paid 
contributions for many years). It also provides disability benefits for workers below the age of 60, 
which are converted to old-age pensions by age 65, and survivor benefits for spouses and children. In 
addition, pre-retirement (retirement before age 60) is possible through several mechanisms using the 
public transfer system, mainly unemployment compensation. A reduction in the pension if it is drawn 
early is being gradually introduced. The possibility of early retirement is being standardised for men 
and women in the long term. 
Eligibility for benefits and the minimum retirement age depend on the type of pension the worker 
chooses. Public retirement insurance in Germany distinguishes between five types of old-age pensions, 
corresponding to normal retirement and four types of early retirement:  
1)  normal retirement is possible at age 65 after five years of service;  
2)  flexible retirement is possible at age 63 if there have been at least 35 years of service;  
3)  women can retire at age 60 if they have worked at least 15 years;  
4)  older disabled persons can retire at age 60 if they have worked at least 35 years; and 
5)  unemployed persons can retire at age 60 if they have worked at least 15 years and have been 
unemployed for one and a half to three years.  
As opposed to the disability insurance for workers younger than 60, full benefits are paid in all five of 
the above pension schemes.  
Disability and survivor’s pensions. Disability pension benefits can be received if a person passes a 
strict earnings test (full benefits) or a weaker earnings test (before age 60 it is 60% of the applicable 
old-age pension). In addition to the above benefits, transfer payments enable what is referred to as 
‘pre-retirement’. Labour force exit before the age of 60 is frequent – about 45% of all men call 
themselves retired at age 59. Only half of them retire because of disability; the other half made use of 
the many official and unofficial pre-retirement schemes. Survivor pensions are 60% of the husband’s 
applicable pension for spouses who are 45 and older or if children are in the household, otherwise it is 
25%. Survivor benefits are a large part of the public pension budget and of total pension wealth. 
Unemployment pension. Unemployment compensation has been used as pre-retirement income in an 
unofficial scheme that induced very early retirement from age 56 as unemployment compensation is 
paid up to three years for elderly workers and is followed by the lower unemployment aid before an 
unemployment pension could start at age 60. In addition, early retirement at age 58 was made possible 
in an official (less popular) pre-retirement scheme, in which the employer received a subsidy if a 
younger employee was hired.  
Replacement rates and benefits. For the average German worker the net replacement rates are 68% 
at age 63, 73% at age 64, 78% at age 65, 82% at age 66, 86% at age 67, 91% at age 68, 96% at age 69 
and 100% at age 70. For the average German worker the net replacement rates for the disability 
pension are 60% at age 55 and rise stepwise to 76% at age 64; the net replacement rates for the 
unemployment benefits are 60% to age 63, 68% at age 63 and 72% at age 64 (OECD, 2004). The 
fraction of those who enter retirement through a disability pension has declined and was 29% in 1998. 
Only about 20% of all entrants used the normal pathway of an old-age pension at age 65. The most 
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Benefits are strictly work-related. The German system does not have benefits for spouses as in the US 
but has survivor benefits. Benefits are computed on a lifetime basis and adjusted according to the type 
of pension and retirement age. They are the product of four elements: 1) the earnings point (EP) – the 
employee’s relative earnings position; 2) the years of service life (YS); 3) adjustment factors for 
pension type and (since the 1992 reform) retirement age (AF); and 4) a reference pension value, the 
‘current pension value’ (PV). The first three factors make up the ‘personal pension base’ while the 
fourth factor determines the income distribution between workers and pensioners in general. The 
benefits are calculated as follows: 
Benefit = EP*YS*AF*PV 
The employee’s relative contribution position (EP) is computed by averaging her or his annual relative 
contribution positions over the entire earnings history. In each year, the relative contribution position 
is expressed as a multiple (minimum 75%) of the average annual contribution (roughly speaking, the 
relative income position).  
Years of service life (YS) are years of active contributions plus years of contribution on behalf of the 
employee and years that are counted as service years, even when no contributions were made at all 
(e.g. years of unemployment, military service, three years for each child’s education for one of the 
parents and some allowance for advanced education). The official government computations such as 
the official replacement rate assume a 45-year contribution history for what is deemed a ‘normal 
earnings history’. In fact, the average number of contributions is about 38 years. There is neither an 
upper limit of years entering the benefit calculation, nor can workers choose certain years in their 
earnings history and drop others. 
Depending on the pension type, different adjustment factors (AF) with values between 0.25 and 1 
apply. Between 1992 and 1998, the pension value (PV) was determined by indexation to the average 
net wages before it was indexed to gross wages. In 1999 and 2000, pensions were indexed to the 
respective previous year’s rate of inflation. The average pension has provided a generous pension 
provision for middle-income earners. The net replacement rate for a worker with a 45-year 
contribution history was 70.5% in 1998. For an average worker with 38 years of contributions, it is 
reduced in proportion to 59.5%.    
The 1992 social security reform and its subsequent modifications decided to raise the age limits of the 
early retirement routes gradually to age 65. Before 1992, adjustment of benefits to retirement age was 
only implicit through years of service. With a constant income profile and 40 years of service, each 
year of earlier retirement decreased pension benefits by 2.5%. From 2004, the age of 65 has acted as 
the pivotal age for benefit computations. For each year of earlier retirement (up to five years) benefits 
will be reduced by 3.6% (in addition to the effect of fewer service years). Rewards for later retirement 
increase the pension by 6% in addition to the increase by the number of service years. 
C.3.3. Public  sector 
There are two types of workers in the public sector: civil servants and other public-sector workers. 
Civil servants do not pay explicit contributions for their pensions. Civil servants acquire pension rights 
that are very generous compared with workers in the private sector and receive about 75% of their last 
contributory gross salary. There are three pathways to retirement for civil servants:  
1)  retiring at the standard retirement at age 65;  
2)  taking early retirement before 1 July 1997 from age 62 (63 after 1 July 1997); discount factors for 
early retirement were phased in linearly between 1998 and 2003 and to reach 0.3 percentage points 
per month of early retirement as in the private sector;  
3)  applying for a disability pension, which is based on the previous salary. The replacement rate for 
those exercising this option depends on the number of years the individual worked prior to disability 
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of 60. For those persons who did not reach the maximum replacement rate before disability, one 
additional year of working raises the replacement rate by only 0.33 percentage points per year. 
The standard pension for civil servants is the product of three elements, being 1) the last gross 
earnings level, 2) the replacement rate as a function of service years (includes also high school, college 
education [three years after 1997] and military service), and 3) the new adjustment factors for early 
retirement. The three important differences with private sector benefits are: the benefit base is gross 
and not net income as it was in the private sector between 1992 and 1998; civil servants’ pensions are 
taxed like any other income; and the benefit base is the last salary, not the life-time average. 
Benefits are calculated as follows: 
Benefit = r(service years)*last gross wage*adjustment factors if not retiring at age 65. 
For persons retiring after 1 January 1992 the replacement rate grows by 1.875 percentage points for 
each year of service. Maximum value is reached after 40 years of service. Nevertheless, there are 
transitional modifications to that simple rule. Benefits are indexed to the growth rate of the net 
earnings of active civil servants. Owing to the difference in the benefit base, gross pensions of civil 
servants are ceteris paribus about 25% higher than in the private sector. The maximum replacement 
rate is 75% (higher than 75%) of gross-earnings (of net-earnings), which is considerably higher than 
the official replacement rate of the private-sector system at around 70% of net earnings. The average 
retirement age in the public sector is about one year less than in the private sector. Disability is the 
most important pathway to retirement for civil servants (about 40% in 1993). About one-third used the 
early retirement channel at age 62. Only about 20% retired at the regular retirement age of 65. 
C.3.4. Self-employed  persons 
The self-employed, about 9% of the work force, are mainly self-insured, although some of them 
participate voluntarily in the public retirement-insurance system.  
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Appendix D 
Relation between Health and Labour Force Participation 
     
TYPE I 
ENDOGENEITY 
TYPE II  
ENDOGENEITY 
HEALTH WORK 
Health Measurement Problems 
We do not observe true work related health 
A. Direct causal 
relationship 
B. Indirect 
relationship via:  
UNOBSERVABLES 
 
A. Subjective measures of (work) related health 
SYSTEMATIC (STATE DEPENDENT) BIAS 
IN REPORTING BEHAVIOUR: 
- across labour market states 
- across other background characteristics: 
  (1) index shift reporting heterogeneity 
  (2) cut point shift reporting heterogeneity 
B. Objective indicators of individual’s general 
health (not perfectly correlated with work related health)
ERRORS IN VARIABLE BIAS  
AGIR – Ageing, Health and Retirement in Europe 
 
AGIR is the title of a major study on the process of population ageing in Europe and its 
future economic consequences. This project was motivated by an interest in verifying 
whether people are not only living longer but also in better health. It aims at analysing 
how the economic impact of population ageing could vary when not only demographic 
factors, but also health developments are taken into consideration. The project started in 
January 2002 for a period of three years.  
The principal objectives of the study are to:  
•  document developments in the health of the elderly, ideally since 1950, based on 
a systematic collection of existing national data on the health and morbidity of 
different cohorts of the population; 
•  analyse retirement decisions and the demand for health care as a function of age, 
health and the utility of work and leisure; 
•  combine these results, and on that basis to elaborate scenarios for the future 
evolution of expenditure on health care and pensions; and 
•  analyse the potential macroeconomic consequences of different measures aiming 
at improving the sustainability of the European pension systems.  
The AGIR project is carried out by a consortium of nine European research institutes, 
most of which are members of ENEPRI: 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
•  CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales), Paris 
•  CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), The Hague 
•  DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Berlin  
•  ETLA (the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Helsinki 
•  FEDEA (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid 
•  FPB (Belgian Federal Planning Bureau), Brussels 
•  NIESR (National Institute for Economic and Social Research), London 
•  LEGOS (Laboratoire d’Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé,  
Université de Paris-Dauphine), Paris 
It has received finance from the European Commission, under the Quality of Life 
Programme of the 5
th EU Research Framework Programme. The project is coordinated 
by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. For further information, 
contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. 
 REVISER – Research Training Network on 
Health, Ageing and Retirement 
 
 
 
REVISER was launched by several members of the ENEPRI network in August 2003. 
The project was financed under the programme on Improving the Human Research 
Potential & the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base of the 5
th EU Research Framework 
Programme.  
 
The REVISER project finances training stays for young researchers in the following six 
research institutes:  
 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
•  CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), The Hague 
•  DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Berlin  
•  ETLA (the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Helsinki 
•  FEDEA (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid 
•  LEGOS (Laboratoire d’Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé,   
Université de Paris-Dauphine), Paris 
 
Trainees participate in research conducted in the areas of population ageing, health and 
retirement in the institutes in which they are placed, often in the context of common 
research projects developed by consortiums of ENEPRI partners. Trainees must be 
nationals of an EU member state or associated state, or must have resided in the EU for 
at least five years immediately prior to their appointment. This network aims at fostering 
the mobility of researchers. Thus, trainees must not be nationals of the state in which 
the institute appointing them is located and must not have carried out their normal 
activities in that state for more than 12 of the 24 months prior to the appointment.  
 
This project is coordinated by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at 
CEPS. For further information, contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. About ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
ISWE-SAS  Institute for Slovak and World Economy, Bratislava, Slovakia 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
 
ENEPRI Research Reports are designed to make the results of research projects undertaken within the 
ENEPRI framework publicly available. The findings and conclusions should be attributed to the author 
and not to the ENEPRI network as such. 
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